信用評(píng)級(jí)質(zhì)量對(duì)銀行貸款合同的影響

主講人 : 周凌 教授

The issuer-pay model of major credit rating agencies has long been criticized for its potential to create conflicts of interest and inflated ratings. We provide evidence that rating inflation affects the design of private loan contracts. We find that lenders are less likely to grant performance-sensitive debt indexed to credit ratings (rating-based PSD) when issuer-paid ratings are inflated. Furthermore, difference-in-differences analysis indicates that rating-based PSD is more likely after an exogenous shock that decreases the inflation of issuer-paid ratings. In response to rating inflation, the lender increases monitoring efforts by relying on performance covenants. Consistent with increased monitoring and renegotiation costs, interest spreads are higher for borrowers with inflated ratings. We further document an effect on other important contract terms. Our evidence is consistent with lenders adjusting different contract terms to compensate for monitoring deficiencies associated with inflated credit ratings.

主講人簡(jiǎn)介：

周凌教授本科畢業(yè)于清華大學(xué)管理學(xué)院，2004年獲得耶魯大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)博士學(xué)位。2004-2012在美國(guó)杜蘭大學(xué)任助理教授，2012開(kāi)始在新墨西哥大學(xué)任職，現(xiàn)為新墨西哥大學(xué)安德森管理學(xué)院正教授，會(huì)計(jì)系系主任。研究方向主要為資本市場(chǎng)實(shí)證研究，曾在Review of Accounting Studies, Contemporary Accounting Research, Journal of Corporate Finance, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 等期刊上發(fā)表論文?，F(xiàn)為Advances in Accounting和International Journal of Accounting and Information Management的編委，美國(guó)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)會(huì)國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)部會(huì)員委員會(huì)聯(lián)席主席，曾任美國(guó)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)會(huì)年會(huì)國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)部分會(huì)主席。